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Youth Political Engagement and Democratic Culture in 
Republican Nepal 
Nepal’s transformation from an autocratic 
monarchy to a democratic republic presupposes 
the development of democratic institutions, 
and the current generation of Nepali youth, 
particularly those in higher education, are 
uniquely situated in that process. As such, Nepali 
youth constitute a distinct generation. In the 
past, eforts to mobilize Nepalese youth have 
been aimed at integrating them as useful assets 
in the service of Nepalese political institutions, 
such as political student unions, but in this paper, 
based on feldwork and interview data collected 
in 2013 and 2016, we argue that politically 
active youth today should be understood as an 
autonomous though heterogeneous constituent 
force that is in counterpoint with normative 
political institutions. 
Keywords: Nepal, democratic politics, youth political 
engagement. 
Tom O’Neill 
Bijay Raj Poudel 
Nabin Maharjan 
Introduction 
University campuses and the political student unions 
that flourish on them have long been arenas of political 
antagonism that both reflect and refract Nepal’s politi-
cal struggles. As an example, in May 2013 the high level 
political mechanism that comprised Nepal’s four largest 
political parties proposed appointing Lokman Singh 
Karki to a six-year term as head of the Commission for 
the Investigation of the Abuse of Authority (CIAA), an in-
dependent constitutional body charged with investigat-
ing private and public sector corruption. Karki had been 
a controversial figure since his entry into civil service 
where he occupied several key positions, eventually be-
coming a chief secretary in the last government of King 
Gyanendra. According to many students, Karki played a 
key role in the attempt to violently suppress the second 
people’s movement and was himself an exemplar abuser 
of authority. Karki’s candidacy was initially challenged 
by some of the government partners, but all four parties 
eventually approved him to head the CIAA. The student 
unions representing these political parties on campus 
did not, and called for a bandh (political strike) to protest 
the appointment. The planned strike showed remark-
able cooperation between student groups that had been 
known to be sometimes violently antagonistic to each 
other. Students joined in protesting their opposition 
both to a controversial figure from the past and to the 
resolve of their superiors to pursue the politics of cor-
ruption and patronage as usual. The afternoon before 
the bandh was to go into effect, however, word came 
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down from the parties that Karki’s appointment had been 
decided, and the university directed the student unions 
to call off the strike. Though the student unions were 
silenced, the incident showed that political antagonisms in 
Nepal persist not only between political parties with their 
ideologies, but also between youth and previous genera-
tions of their political elders. 
Nepal’s painful transformation from an authoritarian
monarchy to a fledgling democracy has been marked by
political antagonism, both within the state legislature
and, frequently, outside of it. We take this antagonism as
an essential feature of Nepali politics, drawing on Chantal
Mouffe’s insight (2000; 2005) that the struggle between
competing hegemonies is a fundamental aspect of the
political. Youth political engagement in Nepal is similarly
antagonistic. They perform the political as cadres in stu-
dent unions, in ethnic organizations, and as non-partisan
actors in civil society. But, though they pursue diverse
political goals, they constitute a distinct social field as a
generation due to their historical location. Most Nepali
youth today were born after the Jana Andolan (People’s
Movement) of 1990 ended the absolute authority of the
monarchy and established a parliamentary democra-
cy. They were children during the years of the Maoist
‘People’s War’ that culminated in a Loktantra Andolan
(Democratic Movement) in 2006 that established Nepal as
a republic. Now, as young adults, they are being called on
to engage with democratic institutions that are relatively
new, unstable, and are rooted in the politics of the past. As
we argue below, it is crucial that the institutions through
which the political views of youth compete become nor-
mative, and protected by the state. This makes under-
standing youth political engagement in those institutions
all the more important. 
This paper is a collaboration between a cultural anthro-
pologist with extensive experience with Nepali youth 
laborers, and two Nepali youths who are each engaged 
with forms of social activism. We conducted focus group 
research during fieldwork at Tribhuvan University (TU) 
in April and May 2013 with members from four student 
unions that represented branches of the major political 
parties that constituted the political mechanism gov-
erning the country (Communist Party of Nepal, Unified 
Marxist-Leninist; Nepali Congress; Communist Party of 
Nepal, Maoist; and the Madhesi People’s Forum). Tribhu-
van University is Nepal’s oldest national higher educa-
tion institution and is attended by students from across 
Nepal. Although the city of Kirtipur, where it is located, 
is part of the intensely urbanized Kathmandu Valley, TU 
students are not an urban elite, as they represent a select 
few who continue their studies there based on their own 
merit. Such a student body is fertile recruiting ground 
for competing political parties not only because they are 
considered Nepal’s best and brightest, but also because 
many will return to their regions with political as well as 
professional formation. We intentionally recruited stu-
dents who were not leaders in these unions, and organized 
several mixed focus groups with students from different 
union groups. Interviews were also conducted off campus 
with members of the Association of Youth Organizations, 
Nepal (AYON), as well as from indigenous organizations in 
order to get alternative perspectives on campus politics. 
More recently, interviews were conducted with eighteen 
student union leaders and young civil society activists with 
Skype software in the summer of 2016. The spring of 2013 
was a significant time for student political activists. With 
national elections to a new Constituent Assembly (CA) only 
a few months off and more immediate elections to the 
university student council imminent, the activity of unions 
competing for young supporters was at a fever pitch. By 
2016, when the second set of interviews was collected, the 
CA elections had been held, producing a dramatic result. 
In addition, Nepal suffered a disastrous earthquake in 
the spring of 2015, and a newly elected CA promulgated 
a revised constitution later that year. The purpose of the 
research was, broadly, to understand the dynamics of 
youth political engagement in constitutional and issues 
of governance in Nepal as an emerging democracy. Youth 
political engagement is conceptualized here as a discrete 
phenomenon, distinguished from, but in counterpoint to, 
dominant, formal political processes in Nepal. 
During our research, we interviewed young people about 
their participation in Nepal’s politics, their understand-
ing of current political processes, and their hopes for 
Nepal’s future (O’Neill 2016). Some students were directly 
mobilized by the political parties, others were searching 
for alternatives to the dominant political culture, while 
others sought to ignore the political realm altogether, 
which is difficult as Nepal’s divisive political culture 
permeates many educational institutions and professional 
organizations. One of the questions we asked them was 
to recall the first time in their lives that they were aware 
of rajniti (politics), a concept which we allowed students 
to interpret freely. Many students, both male and female, 
recalled being motivated by traumatic experiences during 
the political violence of Nepal’s recent past, or the social 
injustice they encountered as caste or ethnic minorities, 
or charismatic political leaders who promised democracy 
and development. At the same time, it was clear that many 
regarded contemporary politics as ‘dirty,’ characterized 
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by patrimonialism, corruption, self-interest, and incompe-
tence. Young people in Nepal today are torn between their 
idealism and the shortcomings of democratic institutions 
that have only recently claimed constitutional legitimacy. 
Nepali youth constitute a distinct generation because 
of their shared experience of Nepal’s recent turbulence. 
Karl Mannheim, in his formative essay: “The Problem of 
Generations” (1964 [1952]), understood generations as 
concrete groups that share an empirical reality as a demo-
graphic cohort. These then share “interpretive formative 
principles” that produce social and cultural innovation, 
including those in the political sphere (1964 [1952]: 306). 
Recently, Mannheim has been used as a starting point for 
understanding how young people’s “fresh contact”
(ibid: 293) with their cultural heritage may produce sig-
nificant shifts in the dispositions of youth that may then 
shape their overall social and political development (Cole 
2007; Ben-Ze’ev and Lomsky-Feder 2009; O’Donnell 2010; 
O’Neill 2015; Kublitz 2016; Snellinger 2018a). Edmunds and 
Turner (2005) suggest that distinctions can be drawn be-
tween passive cohorts and active generations that are con-
scious of their critical role as youth. They argue that in the 
1960s the mediated experience of television, which broad-
cast anti-colonial and civil rights struggles as well as the 
Vietnam war to millions of youth, made a ‘global genera-
tion’ possible. More recently Nigam (2012) argues that viral 
revolutions of youth, as exemplified by the Arab Spring 
movements which spread from Tunisia to Egypt, Syria and 
beyond in part because of their mediation through social 
media, were spread throughout the world because of youth 
rejection of the formal political institutions that oppressed 
them (see also Jeffrey 2013). 
While youth have played an important role in the politi-
cal transformation of parts of Africa and the Middle East, 
scholars have noted their relative absence in the estab-
lished democracies of the global north, where youth polit-
ical participation in normative institutions, at least, seems 
to be on the wane (Youniss 2009; Sloam 2012). Institutions 
like political parties then tend to ignore youth concerns, 
which only deepens their disaffection (Mycock and Tonge 
2012). On the other hand, youth disengagement with nor-
mative politics may be due to their engagement with social 
movements that more accurately embrace their aspira-
tions, which follows Ulrich Beck’s argument that youth 
disengagement “actually produces the orientations and 
prerequisites which, if anything can, will put this society in 
a position to master the future” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
2002: 161; see also Banaji 2008; Farthing 2010). Other schol-
ars suggest that political youth activism in social and/or 
protest movements may be an alternative to normative 
politics (Rheingans and Holland 2013). 
In our view, politics necessarily involves the normative 
institutions—political parties, constituent assemblies, par-
liaments, and constitutional governance—through which 
social antagonisms are mediated. Ignoring these normative 
institutions and how youth are mobilized and engaged 
through them risks undervaluing the unique contribution 
that youth are making to Nepal’s political development. 
Nepali youth played a major role in the series of move-
ments that forced changes to these institutions. Currently, 
many Nepali youth claim a ‘post-political’ orientation that 
seems to turn away from formal government (Snellinger 
2016; Hindman 2014), but they remain far more politically 
engaged than youth in the global north. The overall par-
ticipation rates of 69% in the most recent national elec-
tion (compared to much lower rates in most of the Global 
North) show that, despite demonstrations of frustration 
and protestations of a-politicism, many of them vote. As 
we argue, this political engagement does not mean that 
they accept the status quo; it means that they see these 
institutions as a pragmatic necessity in mediating political 
antagonisms in post-conflict Nepal. 
This paper is divided into four sections. In the first, we 
focus on youth political engagement as it has unfolded 
in Nepal’s transformation to democracy, and argue that 
their political engagement with normative democratic 
institutions is crucial to Nepal’s political sustainability. The 
second section explores how that engagement has been 
objectified in national youth policy as a transformative 
force. The next section describes the patrimonial political 
culture that characterizes normative institutions, and the 
final section discusses youth engagement in identity pol-
itics as they played out in constitutional debates. Overall, 
we argue that the critical distance youth maintain from 
traditional political culture is potentially transformative. 
Youth and Democratic Politics 
Youth have played an important role in democratic
movements throughout Nepal’s history. During the jayatu
sanskritam (Sanskrit school) movement in 1947, a stu-
dent demonstration against the autocratic Rana regime
contributed to its overthrow three years later (Dahal
2001). A student uprising against the absolute rule of
then King Birendra forced further reforms in 1980, and
youth participation was key in the people’s movements of
1990 and 2006 that led to the establishment of Nepal as a
democratic republic (Einsedel, Malone, and Pradhan 2012).
Democratic institutions are imperfect, evolving and sub-
ject to manipulation by powerful elites, but they provide
a framework for progressive change. The critical distance
that Nepali youth bring to bear on democratic institutions
has the potential to transform them from within, and
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even the avowed a-politicism of many youth is a silent in-
terlocution into normative political debate. But, each time
the regimes that emerged following these protest move-
ments tended to reproduce the political structures of the
past. In contemporary Nepal, political elites continue to
be drawn from what some scholars call a “caste hill Hindu
elite” of brahmin and chhetri castes that provided soldiers
and administrators for the previous autocratic regimes
(Lawoti and Hangen 2012: 9). This continues to fuel the
resentment from Nepal’s untouchable castes and ethnic
communities that have been exploited by Maoist insur-
gents, who have mobilized them against the government,
and which recently led to sporadic violence among the
linguistically distinct madhesi peoples in the south of the
country. Nepal’s indigenous peoples, the adivasi janajati, 
have also been excluded from political decision making,
and have been culturally discriminated against by its
elites (Hachhethu 2003). 
When the Republic of Nepal was finally established in 2007, 
the hegemony of the past was swept aside, and various 
counter-hegemonic visions of how to renew Nepal came 
into contention. Youth have been mobilized by all of these 
contentious groups through student unions that represent 
the political parties, including those championing madhesi 
and adivasi janajati minorities, as well professional orga-
nizations, paramilitary groups, and other partisan agen-
cies These groups are mobilized to pursue their broader 
political goals, rather than the interest of youth them-
selves. Their primary aim is to cultivate youth as political 
cadres and future leaders. Political youth activists are also 
relied on to participate in demonstrations, and may also 
serve as muscle power to enforce coercive tactics such as 
strikes, forced ‘donations,’ and the intimidation of political 
opponents. Many political parties, even those represent-
ing minority interests, are riven by patrimonial figures 
who demand an almost blind loyalty from their followers, 
ensuring that political antagonism that exists between 
groups are also a factor within them (Hangen 2010; Pandey 
2012). There is a growing conviction among Nepali youth 
that the political culture of the past needs to change. 
Democracy is crucial for reforming these structures of 
domination, and has been demanded, repeatedly, by the 
people of Nepal. Democratic institutions are symbolic 
spaces where agreements on how to resolve political 
antagonism can be brokered. Chantal Mouffe argues 
that antagonism as an essential feature of politics, as the 
struggle between competing hegemonies is a fundamental 
aspect of that which she describes as the political (2000, 
2005). Youth in Nepal become political through youth 
organizations mobilized by political parties which are keen 
to spread their power and influence over the electorate in 
anticipation of general elections. At the same time, many 
youth appear to be suspicious of these normative insti-
tutions, and are looking for alternatives. They share this 
skepticism with many contemporary scholars, who argue 
that parliamentary democracies fail to empower citizens 
because dominant elites monopolize these institutions 
in their own interests. Nira Yuval-Davis, for example, 
argues that “there is no real power-sharing in parliamen-
tary democracies in which people give up their sense of 
political power, the ability to affect political decisions, to a 
detached grouping of supposed representatives” (2011: 51). 
This view is representative of a broader trend that argues 
that political activists should withdraw from the institu-
tions of modernity in order to lay the groundwork for a 
more comprehensive global transformation. Mouffe (2013), 
however, insists on the importance of democratic institu-
tions. She is particularly critical of theorists such as Hardt 
and Negri (2000) and Virno (2004), who advocate abandon-
ing modern political institutions, because the chaos that 
ensues too often leaves the field open for non-progressive 
forces to reassert themselves. 
Democratic institutions are, in theory, legitimate forums 
for voicing antagonism in a struggle for political hege-
mony, yet in Nepal these institutions lack this legitimacy 
because until recently they failed to contest alternative 
models for political organization in the post-conflict peri-
od. Amanda Snellinger (2018a) argues that democratic in-
stitutions in Nepal have always been tentative, unfinished, 
and resistant to sharing power with those marginalized by 
powerful elites. In opposition to the constitutional con-
sensus that the leaders of political parties have attempted 
to broker, she argues that youth activists are engaged in 
a generative dissensus that will eventually lead back to 
political movements and away from formal institutions. 
But, after suffering a ten-year civil war in which 17,000 
people lost their lives, and with simmering ethnic tension 
between Nepal’s marginalized madhesi and adivasi janajati
communities and its dominant elites threatening even 
more violence, a constitutional consensus that provides a 
framework for legitimating political adversity seems worth 
working towards. Nepali youth have been assigned a role 
to play in this nation making, but many are choosing to 
play this role in opposition to the ways of their masters. 
Nepal’s Youth Policy 
Generations are patterns of relations between the young
and the old, and a category analogous to gender, class,
race, and ethnicity for social analysis because they play an
important role in social and cultural reproduction. Youth
as a category must be understood as intersecting with oth-
ers. Jennifer Cole (2007: 78) warns that “emphasizing the
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concepts of both youth culture and youth agency…runs
the risk of fetishizing and reifying the category of youth,
separating youth from the families and communities in
which they live.” The goal here is not to separate, but to
draw out the distinct features of youth engagement with
the emerging Nepali state. Also, the reification of youth
as a category is not merely academic, as Nepal’s political
actors are aware that youth as a demographic is ripe for
mobilization. 
The introduction of a National Youth Policy and Youth 
Ministry in 2010 was a blueprint for that mobilization. The 
first few sentences of that policy make it plain that youth 
are to play a critical role in the new Nepal: 
The youth force is an invaluable asset of the nation. 
The youth is not only a vital source of the state but 
also a change agent. The youths are pioneers of 
economic, social, political and cultural transforma-
tion and change driving force. This class remains as 
an important asset of the nation because of cour-
age, innovativeness, inquisitiveness and high level 
of self-confidence, which is also considered to be 
a main source of nation building. (National Youth 
Policy 2010). 
The 2010 youth policy covers a lot of ground. It set goals
for youth entrepreneurship along with social justice
objectives such as the elimination of caste, class, and
gender discrimination. It proposes a number of initiatives
aimed at promoting employment and innovation in agro
industries, including the establishment of cooperatives
in urban as well as rural areas, and proposes programs to
assist Nepali youth working abroad. It also hints at mea-
sures of positive discrimination that would bring Nepal’s
marginalized into the mainstream, and broaden access to
secondary and post-secondary education that still remains
practically closed to many youths today. Finally, it estab-
lishes a new government body to implement the policy:
the National Youth Council that will include leaders from
the Ministry of Youth and Sport, as well as youth leaders
from all of the political parties and the proportionate
representation of women and from the madhesi, adivasi
janajati, and dalit communities. 
For all of its ambition, the National Youth Policy lacks 
specific outcome measures and offers no coherent priori-
ties by which its vast agenda could be realized. At numer-
ous points, for example, the document refers to “various 
programs” that will be launched to meet the policies 
objectives, but there is no description of these, no timeline 
in which they will be implemented, and few concrete ways 
by which program success could be assessed. In addition, 
meeting many of the Youth Policy objectives would be 
dependent on broader governmental reforms in other 
legislative sectors. For example, both of the objectives to 
make secondary education free and compulsory, or to en-
sure equal pay for equal work would require policy change 
beyond the mandate of the Ministry of Youth and Sports. 
The shortcomings of the previous policy were well known 
to the committee drafting the 2016 revision, but any policy 
needs to be proposed within a climate in which its imple-
mentation is a clear possibility (Snellinger 2018b). In the 
uncertainty generated by a prolonged constitutional crises 
after the Constituent Assembly was disbanded in 2012, that 
climate was changed. 
Most of the Nepali youth we have spoken to were not
familiar with the 2010 Youth Policy. While there was some
awareness about the existence of the policy, and also of
the fact the government has produced a recent revision of
the document, few knew of any measures taken that are
consistent with the original policy. Even leaders of political
student unions who had representatives on the National
Youth Council were unfamiliar with it. One aspect of the
policy, well-known and problematic, was the definition of
youth as comprising those between the ages of sixteen and
forty. Amanda Snellinger (2018b) argues that the members
of the National Youth Council, many of whom were over
thirty years of age, favored this expanded age range in order
to assert their own authority in a socio-cultural context
in which their elders maintained a monopoly on power.
Many of the younger student union members complained
in focus group discussions that the category was so widely
defined as to become meaningless, as both parents and their
own children could be defined as youth under the policy.
This expanded age range also allowed older student union
leaders to maintain their grip on campus unions that were
stepping stones to higher positions in party hierarchies,
something that many of them resented. One student activist
with AYON complained: “how can a leader who is ten years
older understand the problems of a student who is ten years
younger at the university?” Recently, the Youth Council
itself has come under attack due to the perception that it
had failed to understand the needs of youth and had become
monopolized by cadres from one party to the exclusion of
others (The Kathmandu Post 2016). 
Meaningful youth political mobilization is a prominent 
objective of the policy, but, as with the document overall, 
there are few suggestions as to how this will be achieved. 
There is no mention of specific youth organizations, 
political youth wings, or student unions. The policy seeks 
to establish new ways of participation, and interesting-
ly section six part ten reads: “various programs shall be 
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launched to prepare conscious youth force free from 
distortions noticed in the economic, social, cultural and 
political fields” as if admitting that existing institutions 
are problematic, and placing the onus on younger gener-
ations to repair them. On these new, undistorted means 
of national mobilization the policy is notably silent, and 
existing youth political institutions sometimes reproduce 
the less-than-democratic ways of their parent party. 
In the period after the Loktantra Andolan, and particularly 
after the collapse of the Constituent Assembly in 2013 due 
to the political impasse over the nature of the new consti-
tution, democratic institutions were viewed in an increas-
ingly critical light and efforts to mobilize youth in tradi-
tional ways have proved less effective. This new critical 
awareness has been amplified by the relative freedom by 
the vernacular press in Nepal, the proliferation of infor-
mation broadcast by independent FM stations (Kunreuther 
2014), and through social media, all of which provide 
alternative sources of information from which youth can 
draw upon to develop their own lines of deliberation. 
Although student union members often fell into line with 
party positions regarding the constitution, federalism, and 
post-conflict development in focus group discussions, it 
was not uncommon to hear alternative views about polit-
ical institutions once outside the earshot of union leaders. 
In one focus group that included loosely affiliated mem-
bers from various unions, one student remarked: 
Where the problem lies in student politics is, for 
example, I was in student politics when I was a stu-
dent in the university but I gave it up for academic 
career. What I realized that time was—it’s true that 
politics is a dirty game [chuckle]. We came to know 
that can one deal with political situation but the 
question will be raised—who patronized you? Who 
is the political leader that patronized you? In terms 
of patronizing, people believe that an individual 
climb higher and get promoted in their political 
careers through foul play. So, since our childhood, 
we heard politics is a dirty game. 
The failure of the National Youth Policy to effectively mo-
bilize youth reflects several problems of governance that
have plagued Nepal since the jana andolan (first people’s
movement). First is a rapid turnover in governments led by
coalitions of at times antagonistic political parties that tend
to stall the implementation of policies as new governments
pursue different priorities and the business of gaining and
maintaining political power becomes a central concern. The
policy, for example, was introduced by a Communist Party
of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) led government, but
this was replaced a year later by the government led by the
Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai which collapsed two years
later. Second, and even more problematically, is the highly
centralized nature of the state and its bureaucracy, which
is the cultural legacy of the patrimonial Panchayat regime
and the earlier autocratic Rana era. Policy decisions are
made by political elites at the center, that is, in Kathman-
du, and disseminated to lower levels of governance to be
implemented, with those levels effectively excluded from
decision making processes. Finally, the Youth Policy was
intended to be a vehicle for the inclusion of the young po-
litical activists who played a front line role in Nepal’s recent
struggles, but those activists have aged, leaving them out of
touch with an emerging generation of youth. 
Youth and Political Culture 
The political practices of the past paradoxically remain part
of the repertoire of student union leaders. As an example,
only a month after completing research at Tribhuvan Uni-
versity, the planned election of new representatives to the
Free Student Union (FSU) (the council on which politically
affiliated unions compete for seats) was suspended by the
administration after it was found that many of the unions
had inflated their rolls with fraudulently obtained member-
ships. Student leaders anxious to prevail in the FSU election
did not wish to leave the outcome to chance, or to the choice
of individual student voters. This was a direct reflection of
the antagonism between the political parties, for, despite
the power sharing agreements at the highest levels, they
were also preparing for planned elections to a crucial second
Constituent Assembly that would determine the content of a
new constitution. Extending their influence among stu-
dents in anticipation of those elections was a priority for the
leadership, but the methods with which they attempted to
accomplish this appeared to contradict the frequently voiced
student denunciation of political corruption. 
Like the decision to call off the popular bandh against the 
appointment of Lokman Singh Karki earlier that spring, 
the fabrication of membership rolls was a practice that 
originated in a union leadership that answered primarily 
to party hierarchies rather than their membership. Cam-
pus-level unions report to a student Central Committee 
that reports, in turn, to the party itself. Even local-level 
union leaders were generally advanced students with 
many of years of political experience, and appeared to be 
on political career paths. A leader from one of the Commu-
nist Party unions told us that after obtaining a Bachelor 
of Law, an MA in Education, and completing his PhD in 
Linguistics, he will return to his district to take up politics 
full time. Union leaders from other parties were in some 
cases part time faculty members, and it was sometimes not 
clear that they were students at all. 
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In the summer of 2016, we spoke to a number of youth 
leaders with the traditional political party campus unions, 
the Maoist Young Communist League (YCL), the Associa-
tion of Youth Organizations Nepal (AYON), and the new 
youth-oriented party Bibiksheel Nepal, or ‘Responsible 
Nepal’ (Hindman 2014). In the aftermath of the recent 
promulgation of the 2015 constitution, many of these 
youth leaders were pessimistic about the future and point-
ed to an underlying political culture that influenced the 
behavior of most political institutions regardless of their 
ideology. By political culture, they meant the patterns of 
patrimonialism and corruption through which party posi-
tions and resources were allocated in political institutions. 
A young YCL cadre and member of the National Youth 
Council lamented: 
Nepal is a country of possibility, but the political
parties are not able to utilize this opportunity.
Political parties are blamed for corruption and are
using resources to recruit their cadres rather than
give good governance to the people. Political parties
should leave this kind of political culture behind. 
The perception that previous generations of political 
leaders put their own interests and those of their clients 
before the needs of national development was widely held 
by both youth leaders and by student union members. 
Section 6, paragraph 10 of 2010 Youth Policy, that reads 
that conscious youth must be “free from the distortions” 
that plague social political and economic fields reflects 
that generational view. The patrimonialism and nepotism 
of leaders in the past as indexed by the contemporary 
global category of ‘corruption’ was, however, a feature of 
Nepal’s pre-jana andolan period. Calling this ‘corruption’ 
obscures the deep roots that patrimonialism has in Nepal’s 
political culture. Mahesh Regmi’s historiographic accounts 
of the rent-seeking behaviour of tax collectors, and village 
headmen in Nepal’s past showed that patronage has long 
been a feature of state administration (Regmi 1971). It is 
this cultural heritage that youth identify and question. 
Despite the widespread influence of political parties on 
the lives of young Nepalis, there is growing anti-political 
or counter political sentiment that reflects a deepening 
distrust with formal political institutions. Young Nepali 
student activists must reconcile the legacy of patrimonial-
ism in formal political institutions to a democratic ethos 
that, they have been told, values accountability, transpar-
ency, and individual merit. Though belonging to a political 
party is a near requirement for university students, there 
is a growing trend among some of the educated to forgo 
party activism. One activist with Bibiksheel Nepal, which is 
a non-partisan organization, told us that “there is a saying: 
people do politics if they cannot do anything else,” that 
is, youth who have ability and talent are more likely to 
pursue them outside of formal political institutions. Even 
those still engaged with political parties sometimes openly 
question the direction their leadership is taking them. 
Constituent Assembly, Constituent Power 
A politics of identity in Nepal that pits a dominant hill 
brahmin and chhetri elite against subordinated peoples 
has become increasingly prominent since the early 1990s. 
Tensions between caste and ethnic groups became am-
plified by international discourses of indigeneity, NGO 
campaigns for social inclusion and, not least, the mobiliza-
tion of nationalities by the Maoists during the People’s War 
(Shneiderman 2013). Identity thus played a dominant role 
in the debates about Nepal’s republican constitution after 
the war (Lawoti 2012; Shneiderman and Tillin 2015). Some 
students on the Tribhuvan University campus articulated 
their desire for justice for Nepal’s marginalized communi-
ties and the view that restructuring would move the new 
republic away from the centralizing tendencies of the past, 
but for others there was a fear that constitutional restruc-
turing would unleash deeper animosities and ultimately 
lead to the dissolution of the state. The contest between 
these views was passionate, adversarial, and partisan.
The politics of identity, framed very much by constitu-
tional debates, crept into student politics. In addition to 
the unions established by the dominant political parties, 
competing ethnicity-based unions and the potential for 
ethnicity-based antagonism emerged. A student leader of 
the Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum union suggested: 
This year student union elections are going to be 
held and there may be definite chances of fight-
ing, quarreling, strikes, violation, loss of lives, etc. 
among the students. The present student union 
revolution was based on Madhesi Andolan to pre-
vent the country from more deterioration and also 
for the unification of all student unions which 
were in crisis due to the Nepali Congress and UML 
affiliated student unions. All along, we took the 
stand for the best unification along with indigenous 
student groups and also [reached out to] students 
who live in remote mountainous areas where they 
do not have access of radio and TV and motor vehi-
cles for day to day news about the elections. 
This speaker’s prediction of campus violence was not born 
out as the FSU elections he was referring to were canceled 
by the university administration for the reasons we gave 
earlier, but it shows that many students were sharply 
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critical of the caste hill Hindu elites that controlled the 
dominant political parties. Some, like this speaker, were 
drawn to alternative ethnicity-based student unions that 
arm ethnicity-based political parties such as the Madhesi 
Jana Adhikar Forum. But, the Congress and UML student 
union groups we conducted focus groups with also had 
participants from madhesi and adivasi janajati communities. 
Even in those discussions, both a critical distance towards 
Nepal’s main democratic institutions and an awareness of 
the domination of political elites was present.
The view that political leaders exclude grassroots partici-
pation in party decisions is widespread, but the exclusion 
of those marginalized by caste and ethnic minorities is 
even more structurally determined. This speaker should 
also be understood in the prevailing context as of May 
2013. The Constituent Assembly (CA) that was elected 
in 2008 following the demise of the monarchy failed to 
agree on a new constitution for the country. In 2012, CA 
members attempted to vote an extension of the CA term, 
which the Supreme Court overturned because it violated 
the interim constitution. The CA was then dissolved and 
replaced with an all-party mechanism that was to plan 
elections to a new CA. Some students questioned wheth-
er those elections would be held, noting that most other 
democratic institutions, such as on municipal and village 
levels, had been dormant since the period of the Maoist 
people’s war. There was much doubt that the all-party 
mechanism would ever devolve decision-making power 
to democratic institutions that political elites could not 
overtly control, which had been the case during the thirty 
years of party-less, ’guided’ democracy of the panchayat
regime. Students feared a return to authoritarianism. 
Fortunately, that pessimism appeared to be unfounded.
Elections to a second CA were held, relatively peacefully, in
2013, and the long-delayed election for local bodies was held
a year later. The newly-elected CA promulgated a revised
constitution after the 2015 earthquake, setting off several
months of chaos during a blockade of the Indian border or-
ganized to force more political representation for the mad-
hesi community. The new constitution also laid the ground-
work for the recently-concluded elections to a new National
Assembly to replace the CA, as well as seven new provincial
legislatures. In this context, there is a more expanded capac-
ity for youth engagement with normative politics, as well as
a need for the critical distance they bring. 
The diffusion of political power from the center to Nepal’s
formerly-peripheral provinces, regions, and municipalities
represents a departure from established patterns of po-
litical authority, provided that the new structures are not
subverted by the same interests that dominated political
institutions in the past. The blockade of the Indian bor-
der showed that the new constitution had overlooked the
linguistic, cultural, and territorial interests of the madhesi
and adivasi janajati minorities that previous constitutional
proposals had attempted to accommodate. The rise of caste
and ethnicity-based political organizations offers youth
alternative political identities and vehicles for mobilization. 
The debates that produced this new constitutional context 
were conducted both within the Assemblies and during the 
elections that produced them. Nepali students rehearsed 
these debates within and between their own organiza-
tions, or on the streets during the frequent strikes that 
were called to protest the various models of federalism 
that were being proposed. The Unified Communist Party 
of Nepal (Maoist), for example, insisted on a fourteen state 
model that consisted of many of the ethnic ‘autonomous 
zones’ that had been established during their insurgency, 
and it was a deadlock over this proposal that led to the 
demise of the Constituent Assembly in 2012. Knowledge 
about this proposal, which was modified repeatedly by 
the Maoists before it was finally abandoned three years 
later, was widespread among students. Madhesi and adivasi 
janajati organizations embraced the model as it was seen 
as the best way to assert their claims to greater equality 
against the dominant elites, while students in mainstream 
organizations warned that the model would lead to 
communitarian violence and an inequitable distribution 
of natural resources. The elections of the new CA in 2013 
reduced the Maoists to the political opposition and their 
proposal for ethnicity-based provinces was abandoned. 
Despite this, Nepali youth remained openly engaged with 
a confrontation of counter-hegemonic visions of how their 
country should be structured. Sometimes that confron-
tation became a feature in the political subjectivity of 
individual youths. In one focus group discussion held with 
students from mixed political backgrounds, one young 
man responded to another speaker who had just criticized 
the Maoist federalism proposal: 
I do partially agree with previous speaker and to 
some extent I do not agree with them. The Maoists 
have raised the issue of identity, but they raised 
this issue in negative way. As Nepal is a multi-eth-
nic, multilingual, and multi-cultural country, all 
ethnic groups and classes should be identified. 
The Maoists are proposing single-ethnic identi-
ty in their federal structure rather it should be 
multi-ethnic identity. Power shouldn’t be given to a 
single ethnic group in a federal province. All ethnic 
groups should be able to live freely without any 
domination of a single ethnic group. 
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The recognition that Nepal had been dominated by a 
single dominant group in the past is recognized by many, 
but ethnicity-based federalism inspired the fear that bare 
ethnic majorities would be able to, in turn, dominate the 
provinces that take their name. This view was widespread 
among many students except those belonging to madhesi 
or adivasi janajati organizations, but it reflected a misun-
derstanding of the federalism proposal as it had evolved 
in the Constituent Assembly (Adikhari and Gellner 2016). 
Politically, the Maoists lost the fight for their vision of a 
new Nepal in the 2013 Constituent Assembly election and 
the sometime violent madhesi blockade that followed 
the introduction of the new constitution in 2015 failed to 
produce the amendments that the movement was seeking. 
The project of accommodating Nepal’s cultural diversity in 
its political structures is not complete. 
Street activism continues to be a frequent political tactic 
for pressing for minority rights, and a resort to the battle-
field is still possible, but so far most confrontations take 
place within imperfect constitutional bodies developed 
at great cost in the past. Normative democratic institu-
tions, according to agonistic theory, are symbolic spaces 
on which these confrontations are carried out and where, 
despite their antagonism, these visions can be legitimate-
ly voiced (Mouffe 2005). Youth were at the forefront of 
the street movements that played such a critical part in 
Nepal’s recent history, but translating the successes of 
those movements into institutional forms has proven more 
difficult. In that process of translation, older generations 
and older models of ‘political culture’ may reassert control. 
At the same time, policies on education, health care, in-
frastructure development, and employment that concern 
youth cannot be determined in street movements. 
The struggle to build democratic institutions in Nepal is,
as in all democratic polities, an uneven process that shifts
between traditional political practices and the potential for
ideal democratic deliberation. Having a voice in norma-
tive political institutions in Nepal is still very new, and
that tension is a much more recent experience. Youth are
becoming political agents at a time when political agency is
being transformed. This places them at a critical juncture
between the past and future. Though the 2015 constitution
prescribes a new institutional framework, there is still
much to done. Local political bodies need to empowered,
new provinces need to be named, new ministries created
and, perhaps most importantly, the critical political process
of development and national identity need to continue.
Democratic institutions are imperfect, evolving, and subject
to manipulation by powerful elites, but they provide a
framework for progressive change. The critical distance
that Nepali youth bring to bear on democratic institutions
has the potential to transform them from within, and even
the avowed a-politicism of many youth is a silent interlocu-
tion into normative political debate. 
Conclusion 
One of the assumptions of representative democracy is 
that constitutional consensus on a form of government is 
grounded in the constituent power of the peoples be-
ing governed. This constituent power is evident along a 
continuum of political practices through which people de-
mand and debate those forms, from civil violence, unrest, 
demonstrations, and strikes, through social and political 
institutions of governance. Legitimate constitutional 
forms, assuming that they are not dictated by elites in a co-
ercive manner, are not independent from the constituent 
power that produces it. In the years following the Loktan-
tra Andolan, Nepal has striven for constitutional consensus 
amid stark ideological and political identity differences in 
an attempt to set the republic along a new path that breaks 
with its oppressive past. Even with the controversies sur-
rounding the current republican constitution, it is a radical 
departure from the Hindu monarchy that authorized elite 
domination in the past. This search for constitutional con-
sensus is an antagonistic contest between ideological and 
identity-based interests that would mean that any con-
sensus is necessarily contingent on the shifting political 
practices that produce it. 
Nepali youth have contributed disproportionately to this 
constituent power through their political practices. Nepali 
students and youth participated with alacrity in street lev-
el demonstrations, strikes, and political campaigns; they 
were a crucial resource for the ‘People’s War,’ in the mad-
hesi as well as adivasi janajati movements, and are articu-
lated into political party structures that produced several 
generations of democratic political leaders. In the past, 
efforts to mobilize youth have been aimed at integrating 
them as useful assets in the service of Nepalese political 
institutions, but as we have argued above, politically active 
youth today should be understood as an active constituent 
force that is in counterpoint to normative political institu-
tions. The National Youth Policy can be understood as yet 
another attempt to harness this resource for the purpose 
of nation building, but it’s lack of impact on Nepali youth 
reveals the uneven capacity the Nepali state to mobilize it. 
The Nepali youth we have spoken to are drawn into what 
they identify as the political culture of the organizations 
they belong to, but at the same time many are critical the 
corruption, nepotism, and domination of earlier gener-
ations. That critical awareness has long been a factor in 
Nepal’s political transformation, and may yet produce the 
political and social change that youth imagine and desire.
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